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1 
Introduction 
Christopher S. Yoo 
 
The past few decades have borne witness to a remarkable outpouring of scholarship on copyright 
law.  The increase in interest is due in part to copyright’s growing economic importance.  
Copyright-related industries have now become a critical component of the world economy, 
representing an ever-growing proportion of global gross domestic product.  The digitization of 
content and the advent of the Internet have further increased the value of copyrighted works by 
making it easier and cheaper to access content than ever before.  At the same time, the emphasis 
on interdisciplinary research that has taken universities in general and law schools in particular 
by storm has enriched the panoply of perspectives through which scholars can study and 
understand copyright. 
 This collection brings together some of the best of the recent scholarship on copyright.  
Deciding which of the many excellent articles appearing in this rich and voluminous literature to 
include in these two volumes presented quite a challenge.  Although the best work often requires 
a level of technical sophistication to appreciate them, wherever possible I selected articles that 
would be accessible to generalist audiences without any specialized training.  I also favored 
works focusing exclusively on copyright, although some works discussing both copyright and 
patent are included.  In addition, whenever possible I attempted to look beyond the classics in the 
field and to make sure to include articles that provide a new perspective on copyright, but have 
yet to receive as much attention as they deserve. 
 Part I of Volume I collects articles devoted to the history of copyright.  Part II explores 
philosophical approaches to copyright.  Part III offers an introduction to recent attempts to 
ground copyright law in democratic theory. 
 Volume II addresses the economic analysis of copyright law, which even its critics 
concede now dominates copyright scholarship.  Part I brings together articles analyzing the price 
theoretic aspects of copyright, including the role of monopoly analysis, public goods theory and 
price discrimination.  Part II examines the insights of transaction cost economics.  Part III 
explores the political economy of copyright. 
Volume I 
The History of Copyright 
Copyright scholars have produced an exceptional array of historically oriented copyright 
scholarship over the past decade.  The five articles in this part attempt to frame the classic 
arguments.1  Chapter 1, which began as a legal brief that Tyler Ochoa and Mark Rose filed in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), presents what many regard as the conventional wisdom on the 
relevant historical antecedents for US copyright law.  They argue that the Statute of Monopolies 
and predecessor decisions such as Darcy v. Allen (1603) reflect a background hostility toward 
monopolies that should guide the interpretation of the exceptions for patent and copyright 
                                                 
1 Significant historical works not reprinted in this collection include Fisher (1999), Heald and Sherry (2000), 
Walterscheid (2002), Nachbar (2004) and Oliar (2009). 
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contained in the Statute of Monopolies as well as the provisions of the Statute of Anne.  In 
addition, they see this same commitment embodied in the ratification history of the Constitution, 
relying primarily on the principles reflected in the state copyright statutes enacted under the 
Articles of Confederation and the views of Thomas Jefferson and George Mason. 
 An insightful analysis by Thomas Nachbar, reprinted in Chapter 2, takes issue with this 
interpretation.  He suggests that the early English history of copyright was shaped by two more 
fundamental forces that dominated seventeenth-century English thought.  First, the principal 
economic theory of the time was mercantilism, which, far from reflecting hostility toward 
monopoly, relied heavily on strong, centralized control through guilds and government-chartered 
corporations exercising exclusive rights as the primary means for ensuring stability and a ‘fair’ 
allocation of wealth.  Second, far and away the foremost political issue of the day was the 
English Civil War, which represented England’s defining moment in terms of constitutional 
structure, religion and its relationship with the rest of Europe (exemplified by James I’s failed 
attempt to marry his son to a member of the Spanish royal family).  In order to avoid calling 
Parliament into session, the Stuart kings attempted to raise revenue through means at least 
arguably outside Parliament’s control, including the grant of monopolies.  The objections raised 
by Parliament and the courts reflected hostility toward the Crown’s attempt to execute a 
constitutional end run.  They did not dislike monopolies as a general matter.  In fact, Parliament 
continued to grant monopolies (and courts continued to approve them) before, during and after 
the rise and fall of the Stuart kings.  It was royal monopolies that were the problem. 
 Chapter 3, by Paul Schwartz and William Treanor, re-examines the early American 
history, concluding that it supports conclusions drawn by the Supreme Court in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft (2003).  As an initial matter, they note the paucity of evidentiary support for claims that 
the English history with copyright significantly influenced the Framers’ decisions. Any attempt 
to discern the views of the Framers from statements made by Thomas Jefferson is undercut by 
the fact that he did not participate in either the Constitutional Convention or the Virginia 
ratifying convention.  Moreover, the statements of George Mason, sometimes thought to be 
hostile toward intellectual property, simply used the copyright statute as an example of the 
breadth of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which was the Virginia 
delegation’s central concern after the Great Compromise diluted the political power of large 
states, and should not be taken as a direct criticism of broad copyright protection.  In any event, 
relying exclusively on the views of Jefferson and Mason ignores the fact that they reflect the 
views of only one side of the debate, those of what would soon become known as the Republican 
Party.  The Federalists, on the other hand, were much more congenial toward monopoly, as 
reflected by their support for the Bank of the United States and monopolies at the state level.  
Schwartz and Treanor point out that the Eldred petitioners’ call for aggressive judicial oversight 
of copyright legislation is at odds with the original understanding of judicial review.  It would 
also contradict the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Lochner era’s vision of courts serving as 
roving commissions evaluating purely economic legislation in accordance with their own 
conception of the public interest.  Such decisions are now generally recognized as properly 
falling within the province of majoritarian political processes.2 
 Finally, a body of scholarship has emerged arguing that Anglo-American copyright law is 
based on a vision of authors as heroic figures who create works entirely from their own 
imaginations.  Critics of this perspective point out that creative works typically do not emerge 
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from the author’s mind fully formed without any historical antecedents.3  A group of 
commentators trace the intellectual roots of this development to the German Romantic 
movement and argue that by the end of the eighteenth century this vision of authorship had 
become firmly embedded in a wide array of copyright doctrines.4  In Chapter 4, Peter Jaszi offers 
a somewhat more nuanced account that begins from the premise that authorship has become one 
of copyright law’s central organizing principles.  He finds, however, that this vision occasionally 
gives way, such as in the low level of originality required to support copyright protection and the 
work-for-hire doctrine, which by default vests ownership of the work in the person 
commissioning the work rather than the author. 
 Other scholars have criticized this view, arguing that the authorship fails to explain the 
substance of copyright doctrines.5  In Chapter 5, Oren Bracha offers a more moderate critique of 
the scholarly attack on the Romantic conception of authorship.  He disputes the claim that the 
German Romantic vision of authorship was fully incorporated into US law by the end of the 
eighteenth century.  Moreover, the reception of the authorship vision during the nineteenth 
century was only partial and incomplete, as reflected by the low level of threshold of originality 
needed to support copyrightability, the broadening of copyright’s scope to include derivative 
uses, and the work-for-hire doctrine.  This alternative view of the history suggests that authorship 
never occupied the central place that some suggest.  Instead, it remained only one of several 
forces at work.   
Philosophical Foundations 
Theoretical justifications for copyright have long drawn on philosophical roots.  Chapter 6, by 
Justin Hughes, reviews the two theories most often invoked as providing a philosophical 
foundation for copyright.  The first, the labor or desert theory of property, is traditionally 
associated with John Locke.6  Under this theory, all goods are initially held in common by all 
mankind.  Goods such as fruit and venison, however, must be appropriated by a single person 
before they can be enjoyed.  Locke’s mechanism for permitting people to do so is labor.  
Because all people have a property interest in their own person, the work of their hands is 
properly theirs.  Thus, people are allowed to take goods out of the commons by combining their 
labor with those goods.  The fact that multiple people can benefit from ideas and creativity 
without reducing the supply available to others (a characteristic that economists call non-rivalry) 
leads many commentators to suggest that intellectual property is particularly well suited to 
Lockean property theories, because intellectual property will always satisfy the Lockean proviso 
requiring that recognizing a property interest in one person must leave ‘enough and as good’ in 
the commons for others. 
 Hughes helpfully disaggregates labor theory into two separate ideas: the avoidance view 
of labor (which rewards people for undertaking activities generally perceived to be unpleasant) 
and the value-added theory of labor (which rewards people because their efforts create social 
value), noting that both approaches may justify property either for instrumental or normative 
reasons.  He also points out certain mismatches between Lockean theory and intellectual 
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4 The seminal work is Woodmansee (1984). Other important writings in this vein include Rose (1988), 
Lange (1992), Rose (1993), Woodmansee (1994), Woodmansee and Jaszi (1994) and Boyle (1996). 
5 See, e.g., Lemley (1997a). 
6 For other leading analyses of Lockean theory, see Nozick (1974), Hettinger (1989), Yen (1990), Gordon 
(1993), Becker (1993) and Waldron (1993). 
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property, including the facts that the scope of protection is not metered by the amount of effort 
put in, that some ideas are inherently not protectable regardless of how much labor they reflect, 
that most rights are limited in time, and that most forms of intellectual property can be hoarded 
and thus run afoul of Locke’s non-waste condition prohibiting people from acquiring more than 
they can use. 
 The second, the personality-based theory of copyright, typically posits that creative 
works are so inextricably bound up in an author’s or artist’s personality as to justify giving the 
creator property interests in the work, usually in the form of moral rights.7  These theories 
traditionally claim to be based on the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as their analytical 
foundation.  Hegel believed that property represents the central mechanism by which the human 
will actualizes itself in the world.  The human will begins as a mere abstraction that must 
translate itself into the external world in order to be reified.  The will does so by exerting itself 
over external objects and by having its dominion recognized by others.  Property thus plays an 
inextricable role in defining a person, since it is only by establishing property interests in 
external objects that the will achieves concrete existence.  Hughes identifies several problems in 
basing an intellectual property system on personality theory.  Most notably, intellectual property 
fails to reflect that the amount of personality embodied in any particular object varies widely and 
fails to justify how something so personal can be alienated or abandoned.8 
 In Chapter 7, Seana Valentine Shiffrin challenges the idea that intellectual property 
represents a particularly good fit with the Lockean justification for property.  She points out that 
Locke’s theory begins from the premise that all property begins in a state of common ownership 
and that labor is used to identify who owns those goods that must be appropriated in order to be 
enjoyed.  Because intellectual property goods are non-rival and can be enjoyed by everyone 
without reducing the supply for anyone, they do not satisfy the conditions for overcoming the 
default presumption in favor of common ownership in the first place.  Far from justifying 
propertization of most intellectual products, Shiffrin sees Locke’s theory as militating against 
strong intellectual property rights.  She finds the few statements that Locke made about 
copyright to be largely consistent with her analysis. 
 Jeanne Schroeder’s perceptive analysis, reprinted in Chapter 8, takes issue with the 
conventional wisdom on the connection between Hegel and personality-based justifications of 
intellectual property.  As Schroeder points out, property is important to Hegel not because of the 
personal attachment that people develop with respect to particular things.  Instead, property 
develops personality by defining each individual’s relationship with others.  In other words, 
Hegelian property is not defined by an individual’s relationship with an object; it is instead an 
interpersonal relationship mediated by objects.  Understanding the true role that property plays in 
Hegel’s theory makes alienation of even deeply personal property unproblematic, because it is 
the relationship with others that matters, not the relationship with the object itself.  Indeed, 
because alienation necessarily involves the recognition of the person’s property interest by other 
people, it reinforces rather than weakens Hegelian personality.  Furthermore, while Hegelian 
theory requires that the state recognize a baseline level of property protection, it does not require 
the recognition of any particular form of property.  Instead, Hegel regarded the content of 
intellectual property protection as entirely a matter of positive law.  As such, Hegel provides no 
support for regarding any particular type of protection (including moral rights) as an essential 
part of copyright protection. 
                                                 
7 Radin (1982). For a discussion basing moral rights on personality theory, see Netanel (1993). 
8 For an additional critique of Hegelian theories of copyright, see Yoo (2011). 
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Democratic Theories 
Legal commentators have recently begun to explore the relationship between copyright and 
democracy, exemplified in this collection by the article by Neil Weinstock Netanel included as 
Chapter 9.  According to this view, copyright promotes democracy in two ways.  First, through 
what Netanel calls the production function, copyright creates the incentive for authors to create a 
wide variety of speech important to democratic society.  Second, through what Netanel calls the 
structural function, copyright supports an independent creative sector that is free from the 
influence of both the government and elite patronage.  At the same time, copyright’s scope must 
be carefully limited to preserve what Netanel’s later work calls copyright’s expressive function, 
by preventing hierarchical control of the communicative space by media conglomerates and by 
encouraging citizens to participate in and contribute to public deliberations by creating their own 
transformative works. 
 Shyamkrishna Balganesh critiques Netanel’s theories in Chapter 10, which reprints a 
review of Netanel’s subsequent book.  As an initial matter, Balganesh argues that the proper 
target for Netanel’s concerns is not the economic approach that now dominates copyright 
scholarship, but rather the property essentialism associated with Blackstone.  More 
fundamentally, Netanel fails to explain the relationship between creative works and democracy 
that can provide a basis for assessing when the incentives for creation are too strong and leave 
too little room for individual expression.9  Rather than reconstituting copyright through the lens 
of democratic theory, Balganesh proposes an innovative, new approach that would consider 
copyright as a common law entitlement that can only be understood contextually and purposively 
and whose development is properly left to the courts. 
Volume II 
Public Good Economics, Monopoly and Price Discrimination 
The economic analysis of copyright is typically based on two premises, both of which are 
presented in William Fisher’s classic article, reprinted in Chapter 1 of Volume II.  The first 
premise is that copyrighted works represent pure public goods.10  The second premise is that 
copyright protection gives authors monopoly power. 
 Pure public goods have two defining characteristics.  They are non-excludable, in that 
they cannot be provided to one customer without simultaneously providing it to others, and they 
are non-rival, in that consumption by one person does not reduce the supply available for 
consumption by others.11  Pure public goods are prone to two characteristic forms of market 
failure: markets produce too few pure public goods and underutilize those public goods that are 
produced; and non-excludability creates positive externalities that give other would-be 
purchasers the incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others.  The non-rivalry of copyright is 
traditionally modeled by assuming that the marginal cost curve is flat or even zero.  This in turn 
                                                 
9 In my own critique, I note that Netanel’s proposal fails to engage non-consequentialist theories that value 
free speech. It contradicts some tenets of liberal theory by placing listeners’ interests over speakers’ and by making 
democracy logically prior to speech instead of the other way around. It is also under-theorized, failing to provide a 
basis for striking a balance when the different functions conflict (Yoo 2000). 
10 For the seminal work on public goods theory, see Samuelson (1954). For the seminal work applying public 
goods theory to intellectual property, see Arrow (1962). 
11 Musgrave (1969). 
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gives rise to a classic pricing problem.  Maximizing economic welfare requires that goods be 
priced at marginal cost.  Pricing at marginal cost means that the work will cover only the costs of 
producing that particular copy, in which case the transaction will generate no contribution toward 
defraying the fixed cost of producing the first copy.  (In the extreme case where marginal cost is 
zero, efficient pricing means that the work will generate no revenue whatsoever.) Efficiently 
pricing of works thus provides no incentive to produce the work in the first place. 
 Giving authors the exclusive right to make copies solves the problems stemming from 
both non-excludability and non-rivalry.  The right to stop others from reproducing copyrighted 
works helps mitigate free-riding by rendering those works (at least partially) excludable.  
Preventing purchasers of the work from making their own copies and selling them at marginal 
cost also gives authors the incentive to create by enabling them to charge prices that exceed 
marginal cost.  Unfortunately, pricing above marginal cost inevitably excludes some would-be 
consumers, even though the benefits they would derive from consuming the work would exceed 
the cost of permitting them to do so.  According to this perspective, every attempt to increase the 
incentives for creating works inevitably reduces access below efficient levels, and vice versa.  
Copyright is often said to be an exercise in calibrating this trade-off between access and 
incentives. 
 Regarding monopoly, the classic problems are depicted in Figure 1, with the welfare 
maximizing price and quantity depicted by Peff and Qeff and the monopoly price and output 
depicted by Pmon and Qmon.  Monopolies charge prices that are too high and produce quantities 
that are too low, represented by the deadweight loss triangle in the lower right corner.  In 
addition, monopolies allow producers to earn supracompetitive returns. 
DWL
D
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P ($/unit)
MC
CS
Profit
Pmon
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MR
Peff
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Figure 1 Monopoly pricing 
 
One way to increase consumption toward efficient levels is price discrimination, which can 
permit authors to charge lower prices to new customers without necessarily giving the same 
discount to existing customers.  As depicted in Figure 2, price discrimination increases total 
consumption from Qmon to Q3.  Price discrimination always increases authors’ incentive to create 
works, and, if done perfectly, it increases access to efficient levels.  It is for this reason that many 
scholars argue that copyright should condone technological changes that make price 
discrimination easier.12  Other scholars, represented by Michael Meurer’s analysis in Chapter 2, 
are more skeptical.13  If price discrimination is imperfect (as is always the case), the welfare 
                                                 
12 See Bell (1998), Fisher (1998) and Epstein (2006). 
13 See Gordon (1998), Cohen (2000), Boyle (2000), Benkler (2000) and Lunney (2008). 
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impact is ambiguous.  On the one hand, it potentially allows more people to consume the work 
and provides greater incentive to produce more works.  On the other hand, increases in 
consumption are not inevitable, in which case price discrimination would simply allow authors to 
appropriate a greater proportion of the available surplus and encourage them to engage in rent-
seeking.  Whether (imperfect) price discrimination would increase economic welfare in any 
particular cases is thus an empirical question. 
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Figure 2 Price discrimination 
 
The subsequent two chapters contain articles that I authored challenging these paradigms.  
Chapter 3 notes that the exclusive right to sell a work confers monopoly power only when the 
work faces no competition from close substitutes.14  Because the idea–expression dichotomy 
essentially guarantees that entry by close substitutes is always possible, markets for copyrighted 
works are better modeled as monopolistic or spatial competition between differentiated products.  
The policy implications associated with differentiated products theory are quite different from 
those following from monopoly theory.  As an initial matter, exclusivity does not yield any 
monopoly profit, as entry should continue until all supracompetitive returns are dissipated.  In 
addition, it suggests that the access–incentives trade-off may not be as irreconcilable as generally 
believed.  Instead, policymakers can promote both by increasing incentives and relying on the 
reduction in price from the ensuing increase in competition to increase access.  Lastly, 
differentiated products theory provides a basis for distinguishing among different ways in which 
copyright protection can be strong or weak and provides insights into the optimal way to 
configure each dimension. 
 Chapter 4 takes issue with the way in which copyright’s public good aspects are modeled 
in the current literature.15  Specifically, modeling non-rivalry by assuming that marginal costs are 
flat ignores Paul Samuelson’s observation that public goods continue to pose economic 
difficulties even if the problems associated with non-excludability and supramarginal cost 
pricing were somehow solved.16  The true source of market failure for public goods lies in a 
more fundamental difference between private and public goods, which is that public goods are 
indivisible, in that every consumer necessarily consumes the entire industry output.  This has a 
                                                 
14 For a work analyzing copyrighted works as differentiated products that was published at roughly the same 
time, see Abramowicz (2004). Prior works that recognized the possibility of competition from differentiated 
products employed dominant firm models that are essentially refinements on monopoly models. See Landes and 
Posner (1989). 
15 For a more formal presentation, see Conley and Yoo (2009). 
16 Samuelson (1958, 335–36). 
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profound impact on the conditions for optimal production.  For private goods, each consumer 
pays the same price and signals the intensity of their preferences by purchasing different 
quantities.  For public goods, consumers cannot signal their preferences in this manner.  Instead, 
consumers purchase the same quantity and must signal the intensity of their preferences by 
paying different prices, with each consumer paying an amount equal to the marginal benefit they 
derive from consuming the product.  Reframing the public goods analysis in this manner 
provides several key insights.  First, it suggests that, far from being a policy problem, price 
discrimination is a necessary condition for economic optimality.  Second, it underscores that the 
real problem is incentive compatibility.  In the case of private goods, end users have no incentive 
to misrepresent the intensity of their true preferences by purchasing quantities that are too low.  
For public goods, however, consumers have strong incentives to misrepresent the intensity of 
their preferences through prices.  It is this incentive compatibility that creates the persistent 
tendency toward underproduction that exists, even if the problems associated with non-
excludability and marginal cost pricing are solved.  Lastly, the presence of other factors affecting 
utility means that copyright may be more properly regarded as impure public goods.  Unlike pure 
public goods, impure public goods can be provided efficiently by markets, since the presence of 
other factors affecting welfare can provide the means for consumers to signal their preferences 
by shifting their purchases from one good to another.17 
Transaction Costs and the New Institutional Economics 
In addition to analyzing the implications of public good economics and monopoly pricing, 
economic scholarship has also examined the impact of transaction costs on copyright.  
Economically minded scholars have long suggested that friction might give authors sufficient 
lead time over would-be copiers to allow them to recover their first copy costs even in the 
absence of copyright.18  These claims were disputed when they were previously advanced.19  
They are even less plausible today, when digital formats and the Internet have pushed the costs 
of reproduction and distribution ever closer to zero. 
 As a result, the focus of this line of research has shifted away from asking whether 
copyright should exist at all and instead now examines the impact of transaction costs on 
particular copyright doctrines.  In Chapter 5, Wendy Gordon applies the classic analytical 
framework on liability rules established by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed (1972) to 
justify fair use, arguing for what is in effect a zero-price liability rule whenever the bargaining 
costs for negotiating a license would be so large as to consume the entire value of the 
transaction.20  Although Gordon has subsequently made clear that she regards transaction costs 
as only part of the story,21 the Supreme Court has embraced the transaction cost-based 
interpretation of fair use traditionally associated with her work.22 
 In Chapter 6, Robert Merges offers a somewhat more skeptical assessment of the need for 
state-imposed liability rules.  The literature on the New Institutional Economics, for which 
Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson recently won the Nobel Prize, demonstrates how rights 
                                                 
17 For the seminal work on impure public goods, see Tiebout (1956), Buchanan (1965). 
18 See Plant (1934), Hurt and Schuchman (1966), and Breyer (1970). 
19 See Tyerman (1971). 
20 For other leading analyses of the proper role of liability rules in intellectual property, see Merges (1994) 
and Lemley and Weiser (2007). 
21 See Gordon (2002). 
22 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (1985). 
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holders can create alternative institutional arrangements by contract, including pricing 
arrangements that mimic liability rules.  He also points to numerous historical examples of this 
occurring, including collective rights organizations such as BMI, ASCAP and the Copyright 
Clearance Center.  Other industries, such as the fashion guilds and the Hollywood script market, 
developed less formal, norm-based solutions.  A burgeoning literature is emerging analyzing the 
development of such norm-based enforcement regimes among fashion houses, comedians, chefs 
and magicians.23  When compared with the government’s struggles to place an appropriate value 
on access to creative works and to update those prices over time, privately managed solutions 
seem preferable. 
 The article by Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, which appears as Chapter 7, 
offers an even more nuanced framework for analyzing the ways in which property owners can 
reconfigure their property interests.  They take as their starting point Harold Demsetz’s (1967) 
classic evolutionary theory of property rights, which posits that the world will transition from 
open access property to private property over time as the benefits from internalizing negative 
externalities exceed the transaction costs of defining and protecting property rights.  Barry 
Field’s (1989) less celebrated, but nonetheless important, work points out that, contrary to 
Demsetz’s suggestion, the road from open access to private property is not a one-way street, as 
demonstrated by medieval England’s shift from individual land holdings to a common field 
system.  Such shifts occur when the exclusion costs of excluding non-members exceed the 
governance costs of enacting and monitoring rules and norms for exploiting the common 
resource.  Demsetz and Field, however, both envision the reconfiguration of property only along 
a single dimension – the number of property owners.  Bell and Parchomovsky note that property 
owners can adjust their property interests in two other ways.  For example, they can reconfigure 
their assets by decreasing or increasing the size of the lots, granting easements across them, or 
dividing ownership across time such as occurs when granting life estates.  In addition, the 
government can change the scope of the owner’s dominion over the property, such as through 
nuisance and zoning laws.  They then apply these insights to the copyright context, noting that 
the impetus toward open access caused by the sharp increase in exclusion costs caused by the 
digitization of music has been largely offset by content owners’ ability to increase their dominion 
through digital rights management backed by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and to 
reconfigure their assets by starting to sell individual music tracks.  Bell and Parchomovsky apply 
a similar analysis to the open source movement. 
 Other scholars, represented in Chapter 8 by the work of Clarisa Long, use the desire to 
minimize information costs to explore why the law recognizes different types of intellectual 
property and why their structures are so different.  Scholars have pointed out that the law has 
traditionally limited the number of real property forms in order to minimize and organize the 
information that third parties interacting with the property must process.24  Long observes that 
the information costs associated with different types of intellectual property vary widely.  In 
particular, copyrights tend to be much greater in number and tend to be much more idiosyncratic 
than patents.  As a result, copyright law includes a number of features that attempt to minimize 
the higher information costs associated with creative works, including the incompleteness of the 
right to exclude, the acknowledgement of independent creation as a defense, and the fixation 
requirement.  The differences in information costs also caution against blindly extending 
doctrines developed with respect to one form of intellectual property to another.  In addition, the 
                                                 
23 See Buccafusco (2007), Fauchart and von Hippel (2008), Oliar and Sprigman (2008), and Loshin (2010). 
24 See Merrill and Smith (2000). 
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legal regime will have to adapt to the increasing importance of non-paradigmatic goods with 
high information costs, such as software and business methods.25 
 In addition to the optimal level of standardization, scholars have explored the effect of 
transaction costs on follow-on innovation.26  Other scholars have analyzed the optimal size of 
particular intellectual property rights.27  Others analyze copyright as a ‘semicommons.’28  Still 
others have begun to examine copyright from the perspective of Coase’s theory of the firm.29  
Research into the connection between transaction cost economics and copyright is likely to 
continue to grow in the future. 
The Political Economy of Copyright 
The final part to this collection explores the literature on the political economy of copyright.  
Chapter 9 presents Jessica Litman’s classic analysis of the legislative history of the 1976 revision 
to the copyright laws, which she notes was not drafted by members of Congress and their staffs, 
but rather by the industry participants whose rights would be affected by the new legislation 
(after Congress and the Copyright Office essentially strong-armed them into negotiating with one 
another).  She ends with the recommendation that courts do their best to understand and 
effectuate the compromise underlying the statute even if they believe the resulting expansion of 
copyright’s scope to be unwise.  In the middle of her analysis, however, she argues that the 
drafting process systematically gave short shrift to future, unanticipated interests.  Consequently, 
courts should give an expansive interpretation to fair use and the idea–expression dichotomy 
(which Litman regards as the only two limiting principles offsetting the widescale expansion of 
copyright protection) even if such an interpretation deviates from what those who negotiated the 
compromise intended.30 
 In Chapter 10, Thomas Nachbar’s fascinating chronicle of Noah Webster’s extensive 
lobbying campaign from 1782 to 1786 that ultimately convinced 12 of the 13 states to adopt 
general copyright laws prior to the enactment of the Constitution, as well as his successful efforts 
to convince Congress to extend the copyright term in 1831, underscores the long legacy of public 
interest lobbying for copyright legislation.  The history also belies any suggestion that the 
Copyright Clause was designed to limit the power of a small number of publishers that 
dominated the industry.  In a passage cited by the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), 
Nachbar notes that, unlike the English publishing industry of the Stationers’ Company or the 
modern publishing industry of today, the publishing industry of the early United States was 
fiercely competitive.  Moreover, in an era when vanity-press style self-publishing was the norm, 
publishers rarely purchased copyrights from authors.  As a result, they typically favored shorter 
copyright terms, which weakened authors’ bargaining position and hastened the day when they 
could freely publish any works that turned out to be commercially successful.  This account 
underscores the hazards of making broad generalizations about the politics surrounding 
copyright reform legislation without a clear understanding of how the context has changed over 
time. 
                                                 
25 For other analyses applying information cost theory to intellectual property, see Smith (2007, 2009). 
26 See Landes and Posner (1989), Merges (1993), and Lemley (1997b). 
27 See Hughes (2005) and Van Houweling (2010). 
28 For the seminal work on the semicommons theory of property, see Smith (2000). For applications to 
copyright, see Heverly (2003), Frischmann and Lemley (2007), and Loren (2007). 
29 See Burk (2004), Burk and McDonnell (2007), and Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky (2009). 
30 This interpretive approach is stated even more strongly in Litman (2001). 
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 Finally, Chapter 11 consists of Robert Merges’s call for copyright scholars to expand 
their scholarly horizons to include the political economy of intellectual property rights.  He 
begins by providing a helpful recapitulation of the monopoly and transaction cost theories of 
intellectual property, before turning his attention to political economy theories.  As he points out, 
the political economy literature is rich and varied.  The early literature focused on the tendency 
of small, discrete groups to triumph over diffuse majorities and attempts by special interests 
groups to use campaign contributions to purchase regulatory outcomes (with the cycle sometimes 
instigated by the government itself).  These relatively simplistic studies have given way to more 
nuanced models analyzing the role of lobbyists as sources of information, which suggests that 
special interests may have only an indirect and incomplete impact on public policy.  In addition, 
the fact that special interests are often arrayed on both sides of political battles undercuts 
attempts to base copyright reform on simplistic notions of legislative capture. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Any anthology of an area of study as broad as copyright can necessarily provide only a brief 
introduction to the field.  Inevitably, many excellent works had to be omitted.  Still, the works 
reprinted here (as well as those cited in this introduction) should provide readers with a sense of 
the rich and variegated nature of current copyright scholarship.  I hope that the collection of 
works that follows paves the way for a lifetime of engagement with copyright scholarship. 
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